Mowaffak al-Khouja | Amir Hakouk | Mohammad Deeb Bazzet

A year has passed since the formation of the first government after the fall of the former Syrian regime, bringing together figures who were meant to represent all Syrians and relying on competence rather than political or sectarian loyalties.

The government formed by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa during the transitional phase on March 29, 2025, consisted of 23 ministers, including one woman, alongside figures drawn from the inner circle of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the core of Syria’s political and military administration, particularly in key ministries, in addition to ministers from different backgrounds and ideologies.

Syrians had hoped the government would quickly improve living conditions, which had sharply deteriorated during the years of the Syrian revolution, with poverty reaching 90%, according to United Nations data.

In contrast, the services sector saw only slight improvement, falling short of Syrians’ expectations, while other sectors remain neglected. The economic and financial policies adopted during the government’s first year also drew criticism from experts, who said they were weak and had a negative impact on the ground.

In administrative performance and transparency, the government still suffers from weak governance, making it difficult to assess properly because there are no clear government data or plans on which such an evaluation can be based.

In this file, Enab Baladi discusses with experts, researchers, and people concerned with domestic affairs the performance of the Syrian government in its first year, at the service, economic, and administrative levels.

Syria’s Services Sector, Limited Gains and Persistent Gaps

The services sector is the most direct reflection of any government’s work, as its daily decisions shape the details of people’s lives, from electricity, water, and healthcare to transport, telecommunications, and municipal services.

In Syria, this sector carries added importance because it is directly tied to citizens’ ability to adapt to difficult economic and living conditions. It is also the clearest indicator of how effective government policies are and how closely they respond to public needs.

During the government’s first year in office, service ministries emerged at the center of both public and professional assessments. Talk of plans or statements is no longer enough, and tangible results in energy, health, transport, telecommunications, and local administration have become the main benchmark for judging performance.

Between attempts to improve services and constraints tied to capacity, resources, and infrastructure, this section examines what was actually achieved and what remained stalled between decision-making and implementation.

Participants said electricity supply hours had not improved despite higher bills, January 29, 2026. (Enab Baladi/Ahmed al-Musallamani)

Energy Ministry, Better Services and Price Disputes

The energy sector was one of the most closely watched areas of public service in 2025, especially after the creation of the Ministry of Energy under Presidential Decree No. 150 of 2025, which merged the ministries of oil and mineral resources, electricity, and water resources to restructure the sector and achieve integrated management of basic services.

The year saw a relative improvement in electricity and stable fuel availability, alongside longer supply hours in some areas. The government linked this to the flow of Azerbaijani natural gas through Turkey in August 2025, support for power generation, improved fuel allocations to stations, and the gradual return of the mineral resources sector to production.

Despite the relative improvement, the decision to raise electricity prices in October 2025 sparked discontent after a new four-tier tariff was adopted. The ministry said the move was aimed at reforming a sector suffering from major annual losses and improving service quality.

The controversy extended to the industrial sector, where industrialists said the higher tariff imposed an additional burden, while the public saw protests and calls not to pay bills, leaving electricity one of the most prominent issues in public debate.

Last February, several areas recorded shortages of household gas cylinders, leading to crowding at distribution centers, before the ministry confirmed in March that there was no shortage in petroleum derivatives, saying the problem was linked to distribution mechanisms rather than supply.

The main features of the energy sector during the year were:

• The creation of the Ministry of Energy and the merger of oil, electricity, water, and mineral resources.
• A relative improvement in electricity supply hours.
• The flow of Azerbaijani gas through Turkey.
• Stable fuel supplies despite rising prices.
• Higher electricity tariffs and broad controversy.
• A household gas shortage in early 2026.

Telecommunications, Limited Improvement in Service

The telecommunications sector was badly damaged during the war years as a result of the destruction of large parts of the infrastructure and the decline in maintenance and investment, which affected coverage quality and internet speed.

During 2025, the Ministry of Communications tried to reorder the sector’s priorities through rehabilitation plans and foreign partnerships, but the tangible improvement in service remained limited.

The ministry also faced major challenges because of the scale of the destruction, the high cost of rehabilitation, and a shortage of specialized expertise caused by wartime migration. It focused on the main connection nodes to ensure the stability of the core network, then gradually expanded toward the most heavily affected areas, alongside partnerships with friendly countries and companies to secure financing and technical support, and the development of training programs for national staff.

Despite the announced plans, residents did not notice real improvement in coverage quality or internet speed, as complaints continued over weak networks and high prices, especially as the two telecommunications companies continued to suffer from weak coverage and package prices rose by around 70% to 100%.

Local Administration, Current Conditions and Reform Steps

In a city the size of Aleppo, for example, problems with cleanliness, garbage removal, street paving, and sewage still persist, reflecting the scale of accumulated challenges over the years of war.

The ministry sought to improve infrastructure through road and sewage network rehabilitation projects, rubble removal, curbing violations and encroachments, and resuming the issuance of building permits in line with zoning plans.

It also developed administrative performance by activating the one-stop shop system, reactivating citizen service centers, creating alternative markets for temporary occupations, and establishing a database for human resources, machinery, and assets, alongside studying suspended investment contracts to support future plans.

Despite these efforts, the service reality in some cities and towns remains below the required level, especially in major cities such as Damascus, where basic services face daily challenges.

Last February, the Minister of Local Administration and Environment issued Decision No. 13, granting governors broad powers covering financial and legal affairs, investment contracts, personnel management, and environmental protection duties.

The ministry also opened the door for dismissed employees from previous years to apply to return to work, in an effort to restore lost expertise and strengthen administrative performance in the governorates.

Health, Strategic Plans and Continuing Challenges

Syria’s health sector suffers from administrative stagnation, resource shortages, and widespread destruction of medical facilities. These problems are more evident in rural areas, where many health centers remain out of service or operate with limited capacity. Despite attempts by the Ministry of Health to reorganize the sector during 2025, obstacles remain tied to infrastructure, shortages in equipment, and a lack of medical staff.

Last January, the ministry launched the national strategic plan for 2026 to 2028 to strengthen the efficiency of the health system and improve services, alongside signing 16 international agreements and preparing 26 new agreements with supporting entities.

The ministry said it provided more than 177,000 family planning services, more than 131,000 maternity care services, reactivated 36 mammography machines, and delivered more than 6.7 million vaccine doses.

Despite these measures, public complaints continue, whether because damaged health centers have not been reactivated or because of equipment shortages in major hospitals, such as ultrasound and MRI machines, reflecting the gap between announced plans and reality.

Education, Teacher Protests and Fragile School Infrastructure

The Ministry of Education came under heavy pressure during the past year, with growing protests by teachers in northern Syria over permanent appointments and wage increases, alongside movements by contract teachers on the Syrian coast.

The education file was divided between demands to improve salaries and contracts, an unstable job future, shortages of textbooks, desks, and heating supplies, as well as problems in the distribution of diesel fuel.

Despite the ministry’s efforts to restore and equip some schools, school infrastructure remained fragile, especially in rural and affected areas, limiting the sector’s ability to achieve real educational stability.

Social Affairs and Labor, Camps, Begging, and Strategic Plans

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor faced criticism over the camps and the absence of final solutions to the suffering of thousands of families in northern Syria, despite launching programs for refugee return and stronger social protection.

Minister Hind Kabawat had said the goal was to end the reality of displacement and camps through a national plan under the slogan “A Homeland Without a Tent,” which includes reconstruction, infrastructure rehabilitation, and encouragement of voluntary return.

Begging posed another challenge, as joint campaigns with governorates did not succeed in curbing it, while work continued on preparing shelters for children and women and providing rehabilitation and vocational education programs to reintegrate them into society.

The ministry also launched its 2026 to 2028 strategic plan to ensure fair access to social protection, strengthen decent work, empower women, and advance digital transformation, with a focus on partnership with civil society and the private sector, despite major financial and administrative challenges.

Transport, Restructuring Against a Struggling Service Reality

The Ministry of Transport sought to reorganize its work, streamline administrative oversight, and launch a path toward digital transformation to reduce bureaucracy, facilitate procedures, improve transport between governorates, and connect Syria to regional transport networks.

Despite agreements with Jordanian and Turkish delegations and the restoration of rail and road links, the sector faced criticism from citizens because of slow procedures and the continued problems of transport availability and high costs.

The ministry implemented a plan to rehabilitate central roads, including key routes such as Aleppo, Tartous, Latakia; Damascus International Airport; Damascus, Beirut; and Damascus, Suwayda, alongside rainwater drainage works and bridge maintenance.

Even so, the road and bridge network remains affected by deterioration across large areas, limiting transport efficiency, increasing accident risks, and affecting trade and movement between governorates.

Energy Improvement Against a Lack of Achievements

Member of Parliament Abdul Aziz Maghrabi said Syria’s service sector in 2025 saw no clear achievements in most ministries, except for the energy sector, which recorded noticeable improvements in electricity supply hours and lower fuel prices, despite continued controversy over electricity tariffs and the ministry’s failure to address the issue.

Maghrabi told Enab Baladi that other service ministries had not achieved tangible results on the ground. He said the Ministry of Communications raised service prices significantly without improvement in quality, while the Ministry of Local Administration delayed issuing clear structures and laws to regulate the work of administrative units, which led to stagnant local council performance and declining service levels.

He also pointed to the absence of clear achievements in ministries such as education and social affairs and labor, in addition to the Ministry of Transport, which, in Maghrabi’s view, failed to organize flexible vehicle registration mechanisms or address the chaos of urban public transport.

“In the service sector, we can hardly find clear achievements except in the energy file, while the rest of the ministries remain stuck at the level of promises. This requires precise plans, clear progress reports, broader involvement of civil society, and a study of the social impact of every decision before it is issued.”

Abdul Aziz Maghrabi

Member of Parliament

Maghrabi believes that improving the performance of government institutions is linked to the precision of plans and the degree of commitment to implementing them, alongside issuing periodic reports that clarify rates of completion. He stressed the importance of involving civil society more broadly in shaping service policies and studying the social impact of decisions before applying them to ensure their effectiveness.

Service Achievements Fall Short of Expectations

For his part, Member of Parliament Aqeel Hussein said government performance in the service sector achieved the minimum required level, but does not rise to citizens’ expectations.

He told Enab Baladi that some ministries, such as Emergency and Disasters, recorded a clear presence, while other ministries remained far from meeting daily needs.

“Government performance in the service sector achieved the minimum required, but it does not rise to the level of expectations. Ministries still need well-studied decisions and broader consultations with community actors and specialists to meet Syrians’ needs.”

Aqeel Hussein

Member of Parliament

Regarding the Ministry of Local Administration, Hussein said it is the body most closely connected to people’s daily needs because of its role in managing municipal councils and governorate work. This requires a more effective role in supporting municipalities, providing them with the necessary budgets, and offering legal and administrative solutions that help them carry out their tasks.

He stressed the importance of issuing decisions after in-depth study and consultations with specialists and cadres to ensure they align with the Syrian reality.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa meets with ministers and governors to discuss conditions in the camps and infrastructure in damaged cities, February 19, 2026. (Presidency of the Republic)

Economy Under Pressure, Partial Gains and Structural Failure

As the Syrian government entered its first year, signs of a wide-ranging economic push emerged, marked by a rapid succession of decisions and the announcement of reform steps covering fiscal and monetary policies, the market environment, and investment.

The government sought to manage acute crises in liquidity, inflation, and the exchange rate, while also launching a path to restructure economic institutions and open the way for financial and trade liberalization.

Despite this intensive activity and the strong official push behind these reforms and decisions, the actual impact of these measures on the ground remains limited. These shifts have not translated into tangible changes in economic activity or citizens’ living conditions, and many of the steps have remained more foundational than fully realized outcomes.

From the outset, Syria entered one of its broadest economic transformation processes, centered on market liberalization and reopening trade. The government scrapped prison penalties against traders, allowed the holding of US dollars, eased import restrictions, granted partial exemptions for production inputs, reactivated chambers of commerce and industry, reopened border crossings to goods traffic, and signed agreements with regional and foreign companies across multiple sectors.

It also bet on international investment agreements as a gateway to reviving the economy. Memorandums of understanding and preliminary agreements worth billions of dollars were signed to attract capital, transfer technology, and create jobs.

Yet the actual impact of these agreements remained limited, as a large part of them is still in the stage of preliminary understandings pending the completion of the legal environment and guarantees for implementation.

The work of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Syria also centered on core files, foremost among them managing the liquidity crisis, stabilizing the Syrian pound exchange rate, and restructuring the central bank and its affiliated financial institutions.

At the same time, efforts were made to reduce taxes while increasing collections and curbing tax evasion, in an attempt to strike a delicate balance between supporting economic activity and strengthening state revenues.

In this context, a phase began that was marked by a comprehensive restructuring of fiscal and monetary policies and the launch of legislative and regulatory reforms, accompanied by intensified efforts to combat corruption and recover looted assets.

A clear direction also emerged toward strengthening international compliance standards and governance in banks, tightening oversight of the public banking sector, and introducing modern reforms at the central bank and the Ministry of Finance to restore confidence in both institutions, open the door to international investment in the finance and banking sectors, and integrate the Islamic and conventional financial systems.

At the level of monetary policy, the Central Bank of Syria played a pivotal role in a number of measures, most notably ending the import financing platform and liberalizing financing mechanisms, unifying official exchange rate bulletins, and issuing decisions related to exchange companies and money transfers.

Final and preliminary licenses were granted to around 40 exchange companies, in a step linked to liquidity management and restoring confidence in the banking sector.

In parallel, the Ministry of Finance took a series of measures, one of the most notable being the issuance of implementing instructions for a 200% increase in salaries and wages for state employees and retirees.

On March 20, Syrian transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced a minimum wage that would take poverty rates into account, along with a 50% increase in wages and salaries, pointing to qualitative raises for doctors, engineers, and some specialized institutions.

Among the most notable monetary developments was the announcement of a new Syrian currency in six denominations, while stressing that removing two zeros from the currency did not mean the economy had improved as much as it aimed to facilitate transactions.

The central bank also decided to extend the coexistence period between the old and new currencies to ensure a smooth process.

Decisions were also issued regarding the collection of a 2% advance on income tax at import, and the regulation of financial clearance certificates, alongside decrees granting tax exemptions to damaged facilities and settling bad debts in public banks, with exemptions from interest and fines and the rescheduling of debts.

By contrast, the agricultural sector remained outside the priorities of actual support, while the National Import and Export Committee played a role in regulating trade through circulars specifying what imports were allowed and banned.

At the level of general indicators, public finances saw a noticeable improvement, with the 2026 budget estimated at around $10.5 billion, a sharp increase compared with previous years.

The budget also recorded a surplus during 2025 exceeding half a billion dollars, amid tighter spending oversight and anti-corruption measures, despite views questioning the sustainability of this surplus without real productive growth.

Relative Success, but Failure on the Road to Recovery

In an evaluative reading of the economic scene during the transitional government’s first year, economists’ views differed over the economic policies it adopted.

Economist and university professor Abdul Rahman Mohammad believes that any assessment of the Syrian transitional government’s economic performance during its first year should be read within an exceptionally complex context shaped by the legacy of war, the collapse of infrastructure, intertwined sanctions, and the absence of a unified economic vision.

He concluded that the overall performance was marked by relative success in preventing financial collapse, alongside a clear failure to launch a path of real economic recovery.

According to the economist, the government succeeded in maintaining a minimum level of monetary stability, continued paying salaries, and partially covered the financing gap for essential imports. The issuance of a unified currency also helped reduce the multiplicity of exchange rates across areas of control.

Yet these measures remained, in his description, within the framework of crisis management in the absence of a comprehensive national strategy, leaving the economy in a state of contraction without recording real growth, while poverty and unemployment remained high and dependence on external financing increased.

He pointed out that the most prominent policies, foremost among them the issuance of the new currency, carried an important sovereign character, but were implemented without sufficient productive backing or reserves.

“The financial sector remained paralyzed and isolated from the real economy, as the government failed to effectively reintegrate it into the global financial system.”

Abdul Rahman Mohammad

Economist and university professor

He added that partial subsidy policies prevented a collapse in living conditions, but drained the budget and created price distortions, while administrative streamlining measures failed to overcome bureaucracy or improve the economy’s effectiveness.

Ceremony for signing economic cooperation contracts between Syria and Saudi Arabia in Damascus, February 7, 2026. (Enab Baladi/Ahmed al-Musallamani)

Lifting Sanctions, an Achievement Not Matched by Better Economic Policies

Economist Majdi al-Jamous said the most important achievement during the first year was the lifting of sanctions and the restoration of financial transfer channels, describing it as a significant step that removed legal obstacles to recovery, even though its impact has not yet been fully realized.

On December 19, 2025, US President Donald Trump signed the US defense budget, which included the repeal of the Caesar Act on sanctions against Syria, after both the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to pass the budget.

At the same time, however, the economist said the economy still suffers from widespread disorder across various sectors because of the absence of a unified strategic plan and the fragmentation of decisions among ministries, which has negatively affected the investment environment.

He pointed out that exchange rate instability, the expansion of dollar transactions, and rising prices have weakened purchasing power and placed a heavier burden on the economy.

He also criticized the weakness of the banking sector and the continuation of liquidity restriction policies, saying it had failed to play its role in financing production and investment. He also pointed to weak relations with correspondent banks as a result of the absence of legal standards and disclosure, which limits the sector’s integration into the global financial system.

This comes as policies such as raising electricity prices and weak control over border crossings have contributed to higher production costs and weakened local products against imports.

The economist said the push to attract major investments has not translated into actual results in light of the failure to implement agreements and the absence of suitable infrastructure, adding that many policies have had negative effects or failed to achieve the desired outcomes.

“Growth rates remain low, and disorder is still a defining feature across various sectors, which has negatively affected the investment environment.”

Majdi al-Jamous

Economist and university professor

He also criticized the timing of the issuance of the new currency, saying it came at an inappropriate stage and only resulted in fragile financial stability without genuinely addressing economic imbalances.

The Central Bank of Syria decided to extend the coexistence period for the old and new Syrian currencies by an additional two months, saying the move was intended to ensure a smooth and orderly process.

Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh said on February 27 that the bank had replaced four billion banknotes of the old currency out of a total of 14 billion.

The extension runs from the end of March until the end of May 2026.

From Crisis Management to Building Recovery

As the first year comes to a close, evaluating performance is not limited to what has been achieved, but also extends to what is required for the next phase, especially as the structural challenges facing the economy persist.

Here, Majdi al-Jamous stressed the need to move toward organized government work based on clear central leadership through an effective prime minister’s office that unifies economic decisions, rather than allowing each ministry to continue working separately.

He stressed the importance of developing a clear strategic plan to end the state of disorder across sectors.

He also emphasized the need to:

• rebuild confidence in the banking sector and abandon liquidity-hoarding policies,
• restructure banks and merge them into a more effective state banking entity,
• facilitate licensing procedures for projects,
• create an attractive investment environment that benefits from regional and international openness,
• activate industrial zones according to the characteristics of each area,
• support production by enabling financing and loans,
• benefit from rising demand in the real estate sector by attracting local and foreign investors and expanding organized housing projects,
• support the agricultural sector and make use of strong seasons to increase production and exports,
• develop a clear economic plan, even a short-term one of at least two years, that defines a future path investors and producers can understand.

Changing the Philosophy of Economic Management

Abdul Rahman Mohammad, meanwhile, proposed an approach based on a radical change in the philosophy of economic management, arguing that what is needed is not partial adjustments but a comprehensive reconstruction of the economic system.

He identified the priorities for the coming phase as:

• launching a clear national strategy for economic recovery with measurable goals and a defined timeline,
• carrying out radical institutional reform beginning with a new law for the central bank that guarantees its independence, and restructuring ministries on the basis of efficiency,
• making a real transition to fighting corruption through enforceable legal measures,
• addressing the energy crisis immediately as a basic condition for launching any economic activity,
• stimulating the private sector by simplifying procedures and adopting an investment law that guarantees investors’ rights,
• establishing industrial zones equipped with infrastructure,
• restructuring subsidy policies by shifting to targeted cash support instead of commodity subsidies,
• adopting active economic diplomacy to deal with the sanctions file and build external financial relations.

The ministers of energy and finance attend a meeting to discuss the state of agriculture in Syria, September 27, 2026. (General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic)

Weak Administration and Governance Make Evaluation Impossible

The government still faces administrative and governance weaknesses that have made it impossible for experts to assess it properly because of the absence of published data and a clear plan.

For the 2025 fiscal year, the government relied on the “one-twelfth budget” principle, a temporary budget the government resorts to in order to overcome an emergency in the state that makes it impossible for the People’s Assembly to convene and approve the budget, as economist Younes al-Karim explained in a previous report for Enab Baladi.

According to Syrian Finance Minister Mohammed Yisr Barnieh, speaking to a television channel in September 2025, Syria’s general budget recorded a financial surplus during the first 10 months of 2025 exceeding half a billion dollars. He said this result reflected an improvement in public finance management as a result of tighter spending oversight and anti-corruption efforts.

Responding to questions from Enab Baladi about his previous statements regarding the surplus, the Syrian finance minister said the data he had cited had “changed significantly by now, and need updating and revision.”

In an analysis by financial and economic expert Dr. Mohammad Taysir al-Faqih, there is broad agreement that any real financial surplus must result from genuine economic development and higher productivity, not merely from spending cuts or postponed projects.

Alongside the budget issue, the government also showed weaknesses in its administrative structure, especially in the notable sidelining of experienced staff, reflected in the dismissal of large numbers of longtime employees who had still been in office before the fall of the former regime.

At the same time, it did not return those dismissed because of the Syrian revolution to their jobs except under complicated conditions, granting them temporary contracts of three months, which discouraged many of them from returning to work.

The government also faced accusations of appointing relatives to positions, some of them sensitive, on the basis of affiliations and loyalties rather than competence.

These factors, along with the lack of transparency reflected in the failure to issue government data, made it impossible to assess the government properly or improve its performance.

Evaluation Is Impossible

Governance and public administration expert Dr. Bassem Hatahet, director of the European Institute for Political Initiatives and Strategic Analysis, said that for any evaluation to be meaningful, it is essential to have the government’s approved 10-year or five-year plan based on sustainable development goals, so that real indicators can be assessed.

He explained that evaluating government performance requires taking all aspects into account in order to produce a comprehensive picture that combines the economy, services, justice, security, stability issues, the government’s national and social vision, and standards of welfare and integrity that it has placed at the center of the current complex phase, especially through reviewing budgets and studying indicators. In his view, the absence of these elements makes evaluation and governance unprofessional.

The core problems in the evaluation process, he said, lie in the absence of a People’s Assembly with oversight powers, or effective oversight mechanisms, leaving matters in the hands of the executive authority.

He also pointed to the absence of professional oversight institutions operating under the quality systems adopted by governments.

As for the problems experts face in the evaluation process, Hatahet said they stem from several factors:

• the absence of a clear government plan,
• the absence of a plan for each ministry based on the government’s plan,
• the absence of a reference authority for the state planning apparatus,
• the absence of a government budget, a budget for each ministry, and expenditure books.
  

  The General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic hosts a meeting between the Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection and a group of ministers, February 14, 2026. (General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic)

Six Pillars for a Successful Evaluation

When assessing the performance of any government, Hatahet said it is important to look at a set of core pillars that reflect how successful it has been in managing the state and achieving citizens’ well-being. Among the most important are:

1. The economy and resource management, as there is no standard for evaluating government performance and no real indicators for the rate of economic growth.

He noted that the unemployment rate in Syria is among the highest in the past five years, in addition to the lack of job opportunities in government employment through public hiring and functional standards, which has led to a bloated employee sector and the existence of ghost jobs.

He also told Enab Baladi that inflation and price stability remain difficult to assess because the central bank has no specific inflation standards and there are no oversight mechanisms, making evaluation difficult or inaccurate.

Regarding public debt management, the sector is completely absent from transparency, according to Hatahet, who noted that there are many resources not tied to state revenues and that they cannot be controlled.

Hatahet said the investment sector is governed more by social media than by systems, laws, and economic policies that should frame the investment outlook.

2. Public services, which include:

• renovating and repairing schools,
• rehabilitating curricula and managing the technical aspects of education,
• training teachers and school administrations,
• rehabilitating the health system and making it capable of managing the transitional phase,
• road infrastructure, especially pollution and transport management,
• the problems of electricity, water, and internet availability, and the absence of a clear, phased, and methodical plan.

3. Governance of legal and rights-based performance and transitional justice indicators, which include:

• reforming the judicial system at the administrative, legal, and rights levels,
• training judges and public prosecutors,
• judicial independence and the application of the law to everyone,
• the level of anti-corruption performance,
• the level of transparency and ease of access to information,
• applying transitional justice tools according to precise standards and legal systems concerning the missing, detainees, displaced people, camp residents, expropriations, and the seizure of property.

4. Security and stability, which include:

• the level of internal security,
• combating organized crime and social crimes,
• crisis management, including the role of governorates and municipalities, and the availability of relief materials and emergency response.

5. Social policies, represented by:

• mechanisms for dealing with economic inflation and raising salaries according to comprehensive quality standards for development,
• clear, governable programs to support vulnerable groups,
• social justice and favoritism,
• job opportunities for graduates and young people,
• reducing poverty,
• support for vulnerable groups,
• job opportunities for young people.

6. Governance of administrative work, related to:

• standards for the efficiency of government institutions, including quality standards, job descriptions, job grades, and competency systems,
• decision-making mechanisms and standards of bureaucracy,
• oversight mechanisms in accountability, transparency, and integrity.

Foreign Policy Is Unstable

Unlike the service aspects, the government paid attention to foreign policy, which during the first few months of the new Syrian administration’s life was reflected in breaking the isolation that had been imposed on Syria under the former Syrian regime.

At the same time, Hatahet believes that foreign policy remains unstable and undeclared, shaped by immediate realities on the ground rather than a long-term strategic vision, and lacking a new national charter defining the general rules of the state’s relations.

Despite the new reality’s recent emergence, Hatahet believes that foreign relations and diplomacy are among the most important tools of current and future Syrian policy.

Therefore, the absence of transparency that defines the real goals of the phase and sets out a charter for envisioning the future will keep international relations, according to Hatahet, beyond the reach of evaluation and governance, especially in the following areas:

• international relations,
• the strength of diplomatic influence,
• protecting the state’s recognized interests abroad.

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