Managing peripheral dissent

THE electoral process in Gilgit-Baltistan has concluded peacefully, despite initial concerns ari­sing from the violent protests that erupted after the US and Israeli strikes on Iran.

In contrast, de­­velopments in Pakistani Kashmir are concerning, particularly as the region approaches elections scheduled for July 27. The GB case was managed with a combination of political engagement and coercive measures. Kashmir, however, has emer­g­­ed as a poorly managed case in which dialogue and political processes were eventually suspen­ded, and the state relied on coercive measures.

Though both peripheral regions are part of a similar constitutional framework, Kashmir is exceptionally sensitive, both geopolitically and strategically. Handling political disputes in such a region requires utmost vigilance, patience and care. The ongoing confrontation surrounding the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee illustrates how the failure of political management can quickly turn a constitutional issue into a broader crisis.

The central demand of the JAAC concerns the 12 seats reserved for refugees from Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir who settled in mainland Pakistan after 1947. Local Kashmiris and the JAAC argue that these seats distort local democracy because the voters for these constituencies do not actually reside in Azad Kashmir.

Although none of the mainstream political parties in Pakistan or AJK support the JAAC’s stance that the 12 refugee seats be abolished, the demand has public support. During negotiations between the government and the JAAC, these seats remained the principal stumbling block. The federal government’s negotiating team included representatives from both coalition partners, the PML-N and the PPP, both of which opposed abolition.

The situation became even more complicated when the AJK Supreme Court, in its opinion on a presidential reference, validated the government’s position. The court rejected the politics of street protests and linked any legislative changes to the elected assembly, effectively ruling that the newly elected House would decide the future of these seats.

Despite insisting that the dispute be resolved through democratic means, the government effec­­­tively abandoned dialogue, and instead, ban­ned the JAAC this month, a move that escalated tensions. The JAAC’s long march continues, and dozens of casualties among protesters and law enf­­orcement personnel have already been reported.

If there is political will to find a solution, numerous options can be explored.

The JAAC leadership appears convinced that neither the government nor the establishment intends to abolish the disputed seats, and that negotiations would yield little beyond assurances and promises. Interestingly, voters associated with the 12 refugee seats, many of whom are settled in different parts of mainland Pakistan, have not demonstrated strong opposition to the proposal to abolish these seats. This has further emboldened the JAAC, as has support from the Kashmiri diaspora, segments of which are politically aligned with the PTI.

Renewed protests in AJK have once again energised the Kashmiri diaspora, a development that has caused consternation in officialdom. There is also a perception within the government that India is attempting to exploit the unrest and internationalise the issue.

A question worth asking is whether an alternative arrangement can satisfactorily address the dispute. Suppose the government abolished the refugee seats while allowing Kashmiris residing in Pakistan to register as voters in the AJK constituencies or districts from which they or their ancestors originally migrated. Would such a me­­chanism help resolve the issue?

This may appear to be a simplistic proposition, but the broader point remains: if there is political will to find a solution, numerous options can be explored. A mindset that treats coercion as the only available instrument of governance inevitably complicates political disputes rather than resolving them.

There is also a perception within power circles that since the government managed to suppress dissent associated with movements such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and Haq Do Tehreek (HDT), it can similarly control the situation in Kashmir. This assumption deserves serious reconsideration.

Bans, arrests and terrorism-related charges may temporarily suppress mobilisation, but they rarely eliminate underlying grievances. The resentment remains alive beneath the surface. It persists in Balochistan and the tribal districts of KP and is likely to persist in AJK as well, even if the JAAC is eventually crushed.

But would such an outcome truly constitute a success for the state? If similar movements continue to re-emerge, the state will remain under constant pressure, compelled to invest ever greater resources in strengthening security infrastructure.

Yet increased securitisation often produces greater insecurity for both state and society and increases the gap between them, thus generating feelings of alienation among citizens who begin to see themselves not as rights-bearing members of a political community but merely as subjects of state authority. In many ways, the JAAC, BYC, PTM and HDT reflect manifestations of this broader alienation, even though their agendas differ significantly.

The PTM and BYC primarily articulate demands related to fundamental human rights, whereas the JAAC, HDT and even the action committees that have periodically emerged in GB focus largely on economic and constitutional rights. Yet beneath these diverse demands lies a common grievance: the perception that a powerful elite seeks to govern peripheral regions without adequately addressing their political aspirations and sense of citizenship.

State institutions often aggravate public grievances through poorly crafted counter-narrative strategies. Instead of using social and mainstream media to facilitate constructive and inclusive debate, segments of these platforms are mobilised to delegitimise dissenting communities. Such approaches deepen mistrust rather than build national cohesion.

The AJK protests provide a recent example. A segment of social media discourse began stigmatising Kashmiris, portraying them as ‘parasites’ and as an ungrateful population that had disproportionately benefited from the state. This approach will not resolve matters.

The contrast between GB and Kashmir offers an important lesson. Peripheral regions do not seek perpetual confrontation; they seek recognition, participation, and dignity within the political order. Ignoring these aspirations may produce temporary calm, but it rarely delivers lasting stability.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, June 14th, 2026