How Unai Emery came to dominate the Europa League

Photo: Getty Images; design: Kelsea Petersen Share articleAston Villa could not wish for a more experienced manager to lead them into their first European final in 44 years. Unai Emery is the Europa League’s pre-eminent coach. He has more wins, has reached more finals and delivered more titles than anyone else. Villa’s meeting with German side Freiburg on Wednesday will be his sixth final in the competition with a fourth different club, all having taken place since 2014, and he’s aiming to lift the trophy for a fifth time. The Athletic breaks down Emery’s previous five finals to see if they offer any pointers as to how Villa could prevail tonight in Istanbul. In Emery’s previous five Europa League finals, there have been 16 goals scored. Take away his first — a goalless draw between Sevilla and Benfica in 2014 decided by penalty shootout — and the rest have averaged four per game. The inference may be that Emery sets up with greater attacking licence, but that would belie the reality of each match. Analyse Emery’s starting approach and certain tendencies emerge. He is actually inclined to err on the cautious side, beginning tight — a tactic that brings us nicely to that first Europa League final. Emery deployed a variation of his favoured 4-2-3-1, with Sevilla’s full-backs, Coke and Alberto Moreno, curbing their usual high attacking positions in the final. The solid base came through a physical midfield — who would tussle with future Manchester United head coach Ruben Amorim, starting that night for Benfica — with Ivan Rakitic playing further forward as the No 10. Striker Carlos Bacca’s job was to occupy Benfica’s imposing centre-backs, Ezequiel Garay and captain Luisao. Sevilla’s wingers, Vitolo and Jose Antonio Reyes, would roll inside in possession which, given both teams had three men each in midfield, made central areas extremely congested. As Emery intended, the first half was uneventful. Rodrigo had Benfica’s best chance, and failed to take it. As Emery would later allude to, had Benfica gone ahead, he would have felt the need to open up more, but at 0-0, he was content. It was a case of both sides cancelling each other out. Sevilla’s central defenders, Federico Fazio and Nicolas Pareja, were exceptional, though were considerably aided by a mid-to-low block in front of them that prevented either having to defend one-against-one. Typically, Rakitic, who would be sold to Barcelona after this final, provided the moments of quality in an attack that only mustered three shots on target in 120 minutes, compared to Benfica’s seven. Emery was happy to take the match deep; if need be, to penalties. In the end, Sevilla triumphed 4-2 in a shootout. “You could tell our players were suffering from fatigue and physical discomfort, but this team has learned how to suffer,” said Emery post-match. “We have learned how to stay strong, and so we were ready for that.” One year on, there were five changes to Sevilla’s starting 4-2-3-1 shape. Most notably, this included an all-changed back line and goalkeeper, with Daniel Carrico dropping from midfield into central defence. Aleix Vidal took Coke’s place at right-back, and had a similar remit stylistically. He would effectively serve as a right-winger in possession, with Reyes, now the captain, once more rolling inside. The early exchanges were intended to be reserved, though Emery was forced, for the first time, to change plans after only seven minutes as Nikola Kalinic put the Ukrainian side in front. Sevilla dominated possession and made nearly 200 more passes than their opponents, showing that Emery wanted short, safe passes when progressing upfield. It was also a niggly affair, with 40 combined fouls threatening to fracture Sevilla’s rhythm. It was therefore important they struck back swiftly, with midfielder Grzegorz Krychowiak duly punishing Dnipro’s failure to clear a free kick before the half-hour mark. Emery sensed momentum had shifted and recognised, as is an understated strength of his, that this was the time to relax the safety-first approach.  Just three minutes later, Reyes received the ball in the inside right channel — Aleix Vidal was already outside him — and identified the run of Bacca, who had perfectly stayed between Dnipro’s centre-backs. The striker rounded the goalkeeper before finishing. Sevilla were in control in open play, only to be pegged back by Ruslan Rotan’s free kick before the break. In retrospect, Emery’s tactical change before the hour edged the final in his team’s favour. Coke — who, as you will learn, has a big say in Sevilla’s multiple Europa League successes — replaced Reyes. He went to right-back and Aleix Vidal was pushed upfield. Sevilla created a two-versus-two down Dnipro’s right, forcing their best player and left-winger, Yevhen Konoplyanka, to spend more time tracking back than threatening their box. Sevilla had established possessional advantage against an underdog side who had won just seven of their 16 matches in the competition en route to this final. It was Bacca who seized upon Vitolo’s pass and hit the winner, securing back-to-back Europa League titles. Sevilla were well rested ahead of their third Europa League final in as many seasons. They had been lukewarm in La Liga, finishing seventh, though that should be caveated by the fact Emery rotated his league XI significantly in the two domestic games after Sevilla won their semi-final. His 4-2-3-1 system was slightly modified for this one. Coke started in right midfield, “playing higher than usual” as Emery subsequently told Coaches’ Voice, with Mariano behind him. Out of possession, Mariano became a third centre-back with Coke at right wing-back, due to Liverpool’s left-winger, Philippe Coutinho, continually drifting inside. This way, Mariano could follow centrally and stop fellow Brazilian Coutinho receiving on the half-turn. Emery had identified midfield as the key area with Sevilla’s No 10, Ever Banega, his most important player in carrying out the plan. In possession and against Jurgen Klopp’s high press, Emery saw the overload in defence with two centre-backs against Liverpool striker Daniel Sturridge. Sevilla could exert control through keeping possession and finding Banega, who glided intelligently into wide areas. The Argentina international completed more passes than any other player on the pitch that night. “He had a lot of freedom to move,” Emery also told Coaches’ Voice. “He tried to drag their midfield pivots out of their slots.” Both teams pawed at the other early on without attempting the knockout blow. After Sturridge made it 1-0, Emery was content to wait another 10 minutes until half-time before modifying the strategy. “The principle was to have similar systems and rely on individual performances within them,” he said. “At half-time, we had to start taking them on more directly; we had to play more vertically.” Coke, picked to play right-winger due to his penchant for arriving in the box at the opportune time, was the outlet, with Emery encouraging quick switches of play to him and Mariano. With Coutinho lacking defensive instincts, that pair could isolate former Sevilla left-back Moreno two against one. Best laid plans were vindicated sooner than Emery would have envisaged, however — the equaliser coming just 16 seconds into the second half. Sevilla attacked quickly from left to right, with Mariano beating Moreno and firing in a low cross for Kevin Gameiro to convert. Banega roamed both flanks, creating wide overloads and pulling Liverpool’s midfield out with him, before darting inside with a run that led to Coke putting Sevilla ahead. Their clinching third came from Coke, at the back post, finding himself in the right place. “The technical aspects had not changed,” explained Emery. “Our mentality was more important to us stepping up and going after them.” Having left Sevilla for Paris Saint-Germain following that win over Liverpool, Emery returned to the Europa League in what was his only full season at Arsenal, experiencing defeat in its final for the first and so far only time. This was a different Emery from the Sevilla iteration, moving away from his disciplined 4-2-3-1 to a 3-4-1-2, which had more technical quality but fewer willing runners. Mesut Ozil sat at the tip of Arsenal’s midfield that night in Azerbaijan, with Alexandre Lacazette and Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang operating as split strikers. It was the same team who had overpowered Valencia, another of Emery’s former clubs, in the second leg of their semi-final to complete a 7-3 aggregate win three weeks earlier. Emery noted the importance of Jorginho and Eden Hazard in opposite number Maurizio Sarri’s setup. Naively, perhaps, he asked Ozil to track Jorginho diligently as Arsenal invited Chelsea’s defensive players to pass towards the right side of the pitch, away from Hazard on the left. Aubameyang, stationed in the right channel, made runs behind Chelsea’s left-back, Emerson Palmieri, who stayed high and wide. This created a standoff in the first half, even if Chelsea threatened with greater individual quality. Increasingly, Hazard moved into central areas, with Arsenal’s right wing-back Ainsley Maitland-Niles and Sokratis Papastathopoulos, their right centre-back, uncomfortable following the Belgian all the way in. To complicate matters, Chelsea striker Oliver Giroud would move to the left. The rotations between him and Hazard led to the west Londoners’ best chance in the first half. Arsenal could not stop Hazard roaming and Emerson receiving in high areas. The latter’s cross was met by Giroud four minutes into the second half to give Chelsea the lead. This Arsenal team carried a soft underbelly. Emery gave Ozil licence to move towards the right and create overloads of their own, as Banega had done at Sevilla, yet Arsenal imploded through individual mistakes. Maitland-Niles lost the ball and was caught out of position as Hazard crossed for Pedro to double the lead on the hour. He then bumped clumsily into Giroud, who had pulled to the left once more, handing Chelsea a 65th-minute penalty and a 3-0 lead.  Emery switched to 4-2-3-1 with Aubameyang off the right. Substitute Alex Iwobi, who helped enact the shape change, pulled one back. Yet a mere three minutes later, Aubameyang, now dropping into deeper and wider positions, lost the ball in his own half. Giroud and Hazard pounced. Three of Chelsea’s goals in this final stemmed from individual errors, which Emery, as he bemoaned post-match, could not account for. “In the Europa League, we have been absolutely impeccable,” Emery asserted in his post-match press conference, reflecting on Villarreal’s eye-catching triumph in Poland. An initial 4-2-3-1 was tweaked to a 4-2-4 out of possession, with midfield duo Etienne Capoue and Dani Parejo screening passes into Bruno Fernandes, United’s central cog. Emery wanted the ball to stay in front of his team’s shape, allowing United to have possession in harmless areas. The objective was to intercept passes into Fernandes, leading to opportunities to counter.  When Villarreal did have comfortable possession, as was a theme with Emery previously at Sevilla and now at Villa, left-winger Manu Trigueros would gravitate inside, giving them an extra player centrally to progress the ball. Simultaneously, left-back Alfonso Pedraza overlapped, and one of their strikers, either Gerard Moreno or Bacca, spun into the left channel, dragging centre-back Eric Bailly out wide, just as Ollie Watkins does now. Villarreal only recorded one shot on target — Moreno’s goal in the 29th minute — but limited United to two. When Edinson Cavani equalised early in the second half, Emery had to re-energise his team’s efforts. He substituted half of his outfield players within the 90 minutes, shrewdly changing both full-backs to avoid United’s pacey wingers, Daniel James and Marcus Rashford, isolating them one against one. Sevilla hung in during extra time and then, in a marathon shootout, goalkeeper David de Gea missed United’s 11th spot kick to give Emery a record fourth Europa League trophy. Five years on, he will aim for his fifth, and Villa’s first major trophy since 1996, in Istanbul this evening. Victory would immortalise him in club folklore. Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms