Afghans, terrorists - and the border

As of late March, acrimony and mistrust continue to drive relations with Afghanistan. Following the Eid break, Pakistan has resumed the hunt for terrorist sanctuaries in the neighbourhood. The borders have remained shut down since October 11 for Kabul's refusal to take conclusive, verifiable action against TTP. Nothing, it seems, has moved the Afghan regime, and it has reiterated religious affinity, political camaraderie and tribal traditions as the reason for cracking down on terrorist networks nestled in Afghanistan. This throws up two challenges for all: the lingering border issue repeatedly trumped up by Afghans at large, and the security concerns flowing from the presence of terrorist outfits in Afghanistan. Let us first dissect the former. All through the decades since Pakistan's birth in 1947, the only issue that seemingly unites Afghans of all shades is the "Durand Line". Royalists, socialists and Pashtoon nationalists always hid behind the "border issue" when short of logically substantive arguments. The Pakhtunistan Square in the heart of Kabul, just outside the President's Palace, testifies to the deep-seated contention wrapped in the "Durand Line". Even the religious Taliban spare no opportunity in relentlessly parroting the "imaginary line" mantra. It leaves little doubt that this stands out as a unifying factor – if you may call it so – and herewith begins the issue with Pakistan, which inherited the 2560 km border as its line separating it from Afghanistan in 1947. When the Taliban first seized Kandahar in late 1995, and Pakistan offered to reconstruct the Chamman-Kandahar Road, foreign minister Muttawakil told interior minister Naseerullah Babar that after fixing the Chamman-Spin Boldak patch, "you shall have to hand over the entire project to us. We don't want to be accused by other Afghans of having compromised our stance on the 'disputed' nature of the border." Muttawakil's condition practically killed the Chamman-Kandahar road reconstruction project. Three decades on, the Afghans' obsession with the "Durand Line" stays very much alive. Additionally, the TTP seemed to have been turned into a vehicle for pursuing the same dream: ex-FATA's restoration constituted one of the three core demands that the TTP put on the table during multiple rounds of talks. By munching on the Durand Line mantra, they all imply that the boundary be redrawn to grant back the Pashtoons their lands. Is that possible at all? Essentially, this represents a Gordian knot for Pakistan to untie as deftly as possible; friction-free relations don't seem possible without putting this issue permanently to rest. Now to the issue of security. Following a string of critical reports – including those by the United Nations, Russia and Pakistan – on the presence in Afghanistan of groups such as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), China too has joined the chorus. For the first time, a Chinese researcher has publicly called out Afghanistan's Taliban for sheltering ETIM. Liu Zongyi, Director of the South Asia Research Centre at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, visited Afghanistan as an official guest. The idea was to showcase the progress the country has made since August 2021, when the Taliban stormed back to power. Zongyi's post-visit interview with a Chinese news outlet (Guancha.cn) contains eye-opening observations and convulsions that must have surprised, if not shocked, his Taliban hosts. "The security issue, especially concerning the ETIM, has become the most difficult sticking point in our discussions with the Taliban," the scholar stated when asked about the security and the presence of various terrorist groups in Afghanistan. What the de facto Afghan officials claimed about the ETIM made the related diplomatic issues even more complicated, the researcher cautioned. "They confidently claim that the ETIM organisation is now fully under their control, helps maintain order in certain areas and pledged allegiance to the Taliban leadership, and hence they are clearly reluctant to fully meet China's relevant demands," he told Guancha. The Chinese academic has only reiterated those grievances and concerns that Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan and Russia have been articulating, only to be brushed aside by the Taliban officials in Kabul and Kandahar. This complex context reminds us of prophetic warnings that noted political scientist Eqbal Ahmad had penned back in 1998, a few months after the Taliban had captured Kabul. "Policy-makers in Islamabad assume that a Taliban dominated government in Kabul will be permanently friendly towards Pakistan … The chances are that if they remain in power, the Taliban will turn on Pakistan, linking their brand of 'Islamism' with a revived movement for Pakhtunistan. I have met some of them and found ethnic nationalism lurking just below their 'Islamic' skin. Also, as the threat of local rivals recedes, their resentments against Pakistan's government shall rapidly augment, as Islamabad will not be in a position to meet their expectations of aid. The convergence of ethnic nationalism and religion can mobilise people decisively." Ahmed's fears of the Taliban turning on Pakistan or on the eventual mobilisation of Pashtoon nationalism across the border remain a potent destabilising prospect when it comes to denigrating Pakistan. Scores of posts across social media testify to the consensus that the border issue generates across all shades of Afghans. For dispelling these apprehensions, the Afghan Taliban need to address the reservations of its neighbours for a friction-free lasting relationship. Pakistan, on its part, requires deft diplomacy to lay down conditions for resuming contacts. Closing borders, nevertheless, is no recipe for countering terrorism or bending the Taliban.